Public private partnerships: A procurement device to manage public sector debt by Chung, Demi
 I T L S 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITLS-WP-08-11 
 
 
Public private partnerships: 
A procurement device to 
manage public sector debt 
 
 
By 
 
Demi Chung 
 
 
June 2008 
 
 
ISSN 1832-570X 
 
INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and 
LOGISTICS STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre in 
Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program.
NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-08-11 
TITLE: Private partnerships:  A procurement device to manage 
public sector debt  
ABSTRACT: Australian governments are amongst the leading advocates 
of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a public 
procurement policy.  After two decades of experience, it is 
timely to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy.  At the 
aggregate level, PPPs were launched to induce private 
participation in public infrastructures to covertly contrive 
the removal of visible public debt.  Drawing from the 
social dynamic framework of interests (Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2002), this paper shows that PPPs are a powerful 
procurement device to legitimise the social existence of the 
state.  This article explores the experience of the first 
hospital (the Port Macquarie Base Hospital) and a recent 
toll road (the Cross City Tunnel) delivered under the Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) model in the State of New 
South Wales, Australia.  The study shows that the policy 
has effectively established the market of PPPs in a variety 
of sectors.  Lessons to be learnt from this paper include the 
need for policy makers to be wary of the interest that 
dictates the policy.  Failing to take into account the 
interests of the community would impeach the democratic 
legitimacy of the state. 
KEY WORDS: Public private partnerships, social dynamic framework of 
interests, public procurement policy, Port Macquarie 
Base Hospital, Cross City Tunnel   
AUTHOR: Demi Chung 
CONTACT: Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (C37) 
The Australian Key Centre in Transport Management 
The University of Sydney   NSW   2006   Australia 
 
Telephone: +61 9351 0071 
Facsimile:  +61 9351 0088 
E-mail: itlsinfo@itls.usyd.edu.au 
Internet: http://www.itls.usyd.edu.au 
 
DATE: June 2008 
Acknowledgement  
 
I thank Professor David Hensher for his valuable 
comments which have significantly improved the quality 
of this paper.  All errors herein are entirely mine. 
 
Public private partnerships:  A procurement device to manage public sector debt 
Chung 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have seemingly gone through two distinct but inter-
related phases.  Initially PPPs emerged as a procurement technique within the 
macroeconomic policy agenda. Subsequently they evolved into a microeconomic 
procurement policy.  This ‘macro/micro’ interface is established through the accounting 
treatment of PPPs and the notions of value for money (VFM) (Broadbent & Laughlin, 
1999: 102).   
Many argue that PPPs originally emanated from a macroeconomic policy agenda that 
was underlined by a desire to control visible levels of public debt (cf. Heald & Dowdall, 
1999; Walker & Walker, 2000; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002).  Others suggest that in 
later stages the focus has moved away from the concern with public borrowings (cf. 
Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002) to the microeconomic level, with the spot light trained on 
the trait of VFM through efficient assignment of risk (cf. Broadbent et al., 2003; 
Edwards & Shaoul, 2003; Quiggin, 2005a; Ismail & Pendlebury, 2006; Ball et al., 
2007).  This paper contests this widely accepted view of the functionality of PPPs and 
the opinion that the desirability of PPPs was only an ideological preference (cf. 
JSCCCT, 2006a: 58).  It argues that the inherent functionality of PPPs remains static 
over these two distinct phases.  PPPs are a powerful device for fostering capital 
accumulation.  In so doing, the defence of the state’s social legitimacy is continuously 
solidified.  This self interest of the state is materialised in two stages.  At the outset, 
PPPs were embarked on to amplify the private sector’s interests in the operations of 
large scale infrastructure-based services.  The purpose was to covertly bring in the 
private finance strategy to accomplish its fiscal policy objective of minimising levels of 
public debt.  This effort has witnessed the surrender of the public interest in order to 
have recourse to private finance (Mills, 1991; Shaoul et al., 2006).  To date, the 
macroeconomic policy agenda underpinning the pursuit of PPP schemes remains a 
strong force circumscribing the implementation process; the promise of VFM through 
appropriate risk transfer is nothing more than legitimising PPP procurements.   
This paper investigates both an early and a recent experience of PPPs in Australia.  It 
presents accounting data to uncover the putative financial motives dictating the ex ante 
appraisal process that was designed to defend the choice of PPPs over public finance 
options.  The cases examined are the Port Macquarie Base Hospital (PMBH) and the 
Cross City Tunnel (CCT) in the State of New South Wales (NSW).  The PMBH 
represents the first PPP hospital in NSW and the CCT is the most recent toll road 
project in the history of Australian PPPs to be seen as a failure by many pundits.  The 
lesson of the hospital demonstrates that the effort to entice greater private provision in 
the public hospital services has ceded public funds to the concessionaire for the 
financing of profitable services.  The experience of the toll road illustrates that 
compromising the community’s interest to shelter the public sector from cost exposure, 
has rendered the unlikeliness of the public’s acceptance of the policy.   
The remainder of this paper is organised into four parts.  The following section 
conceptualises PPPs.  This is followed by Section Three that reviews the international 
proliferation of PPPs as a macroeconomic technical tool to manage public sector debt.  
In particular it will examine contextually, within the social dynamic framework of 
interests, governments’ infatuation over the ‘prudent’ levels of public debt.  Given this 
groundwork, the investigation of the PMBH and the CCT in Section Four exemplifies 
PPPs as a political instrument to uphold the legitimation of the state.  The paper 
concludes its findings in Section Five.   
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2. Public private partnerships  
Public Private Partnerships1 are public procurement policies that encourage the public 
sector to supply asset-based services to the public by purchasing them from the private 
sector rather than by direct provision (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002: 622).  They 
encompass a range of financial and organisational relationships between the public and 
private sectors (Edwards et al., 2004: 17).  These relationships are established by a 
concession contract which enables a separate legal entity in the form of a ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ (SPV) created under private ownership to finance, build and operate an 
asset for an agreed period.  The SPV is also the legal owner of the project related assets 
during the concession term (Kozarovski, 2006: 309).  One of the distinct qualities of the 
PPP package is that there is a minimum interface between the government body and 
other parties including the users of the PPPed service in the relationship cobweb.  Once 
the project reaches financial close, most aspects of the contract’s execution and 
management are facilitated directly by the SPV.   
The concession can take many forms (for the commonly used forms, see Duffield, 2001: 
28).  The most popular form is the Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO)2 where 
the SPV is contracted to supply a bundling product.  This product comprises two 
provisions: the provision of assets, such as buildings, roads and equipment; and the 
provision of services, such as asset maintenance, and cleaning and catering (Hellowell 
& Pollock, 2007).  The underlying concept is that the public sector purchases a service 
instead of an asset, albeit the periodic payments over the length of the concession 
explicitly contain a significant proportion to cover the price of the asset plus a profitable 
margin, whereas the purchase of the service provision is specifically dealt with by a 
considerably smaller proportion.  The length of the concession period is determined on 
the basis that the sales of the bundling services are sufficient to discharge construction, 
financing, operation and maintenance costs plus a generous profit for private capital 
investors (Duffield, 2001: 27).  At the conclusion of the concession, the ownership of 
the property will normally revert back to the public sector at no charge3. 
PPPs are in themselves a capital accumulation process to profit a small class of 
powerful capital owners.  The above periodic payments are formally known as the 
“unitary charge” (Hellowell & Pollock, 2007).  It is structured into two tiers to ensure 
borrowings of the SPV are duly protected: the availability charge pays for the provision 
of assets; the service charge remunerates the provision of services.  The predetermined 
level of the availability charge must be sufficient to: (i) recompense interest and 
principal payments on the debt taken out by the SPV; (ii) pay dividends to private 
capital owners; and (iii) deposit into the cash reserve held by the SPV for the purpose of 
covering the asset’s lifecycle costs, any surplus in the reserve will be passed over to the 
private capital owners at the end of the concession period (Hellowell & Pollock, 2007: 
351-352).   
                                                          
1 It is also termed Privately Financed Projects (PFPs) by the NSW Government (WWG, 2006).  The early generation of the British 
equivalent is named Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  In this study, these terms are interchangeable, while PFIs refer specifically to 
projects undertaken in the UK 
2 The use of terminology varies between countries.  In the UK, DBFO in transport involves the transfer of ownership at the end of 
concession period (Glaister et al., 2000) while the similar arrangement in Australia is termed BOOT (Debande, 2002: 380). 
3 The zero reversion cost should not be seen as buying a property at no cost.  Financial commitments from the public purchaser to 
the private owner during the concession period, as argued by Heald (2003: 359), were in fact paying for the post-concession life of 
the property.   
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The most innovative idea related to the DBFO is the built-in incentive mechanism 
contained within the payment structure.  Both charges are linked to the requirements set 
out in the output specification and the results of the risk assessment (Akbiyikli et al., 
2006: 72).  They are payable only when the service meets required standards (Debande, 
2002: 359).  The objectives are to motivate the private proponent to deliver VFM over 
the whole length of the concession.  Because the recoupment of costs and future profit 
rely on a flow of suitable quality services from the asset, the private proponent is thus 
encouraged to build the required asset with agreed costs, and of high quality (Debande, 
2002: 360).  Further, the revenue receipts flow to the SPV only when the construction of 
the asset has been completed and the service is fully operational, thus the concessionaire 
is incentivised to finish the construction element sooner.  Evidence suggests that the 
PPP contractual mechanism has better facilitated the integration between the asset 
creation and its ongoing management compared with contracts delivered under the 
traditional method (NAO, 2003).  Figure 1 depicts the incentive scheme established 
through the interdependence of these core elements in an archetypical DBFO contract.  
The dashed line connecting the “payment mechanism” and the “asset” iterates the 
principle of DBFO, that is, the purchase of the service not the asset itself.   
 
 
The role the private sector plays in the second element of this bundling product varies 
between social infrastructure and economic infrastructure projects.  Social infrastructure 
projects, such as hospitals, schools and prisons, where the state retains demand risk 
(NSW Treasury, 2007: 1) are normally funded from state revenue (English & Guthrie, 
2003: 503).  The private sector’s role is limited to managing the physical facility to a 
specified level that is suitable for delivering the required service (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005: 346).  The delivery of font-line services, i.e. clinical or educational services to the 
community, is outside the scope of the DBFO (cf. Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004; English 
& Baxter, 2007).   
Economic infrastructure projects, such as toll roads and railways, where the private 
sector bears the market risk (NSW Treasury, 2007: 1), are capital-intensive.  Thus, the 
creation of assets is likely to dominate (WWG, 2006: 8).  The responsibilities for 
ancillary assets vary between railway and road projects.  In DBFO railways, the 
Figure 1:  Relationship between the payment mechanism, quality of the asset and 
asset-based services
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operation and maintenance of stations and rolling stock are the responsibility of the 
private proponent, while the operation of the railway remains in the hands of the public 
sector4.  In DBFO roads, after the construction is complete, the provision of the 
associated service, e.g. toll collection, roadwork and lighting maintenance, is a 
relatively minor component of the arrangement (Walker, 2005).  The public sector’s 
involvement is limited to monitoring the adherence to the contract and renegotiation of 
changes to services supplied (Debande, 2002: 367).  In exchange, the private operator 
negotiates a concession right with the government for a period (English, 2005) that 
warrants the rate of return to private equity (Arndt, 1998; Glaister et al., 2000).   
 
3. A device in the macroeconomic policy agenda 
Since the early 1990s, the thrust of meeting a chronic need for infrastructure 
development and an associated desire to restrain the measured level of public sector 
borrowings (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002: 629; English & Guthrie, 2003: 494; 
Rutherford, 2003: 373; Quiggin, 2005a: 446) have proliferated the procurement policy.  
The following discussion examines the political agenda underpinning the evolution of 
PPPs in the UK and Australia.  These two countries all use the British style of PPP-PSC 
(Public Sector Comparator) VFM approach.5   
The PPPs policy was first formally introduced in 1992 by the UK Government.  At the 
time, curbing inflation was the paramount economic objective in the public policy 
agenda at the global level.  Such a macroeconomic climate necessitated tight controls 
over public spending.  The British HM Treasury launched a control total in 1992 setting 
a fixed level for all public spending each year (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1999: 97).  
Australian state governments’ spending was capped by ‘global limits’ imposed by the 
Loan Council6 (Walker & Walker, 2000: 190).  It appears that these countries were keen 
to reduce the level of public debt, but the attention was targeted only at debt appearing 
on governments’ balance sheets.  PPPs have become a convenient technical accounting 
device for this hidden agenda.  The service delivery mechanism is most appealing to 
infrastructure-based services because their asset construction consumes significant 
amounts of capital, while PPPs involve no new asset appearing on the public sector’s 
balance sheet (Heald & Dowdall, 1999:243).   
In both countries, PPP costs were excluded from being set against the given level of 
public capital provision.  In the UK, only the annual lease cost for operational services 
counted against the controlled total.  The dominant financial element associated with the 
use of these facilities would not enter into the relevant accounts.  This was justified and 
supported by the steering mechanism7 (Rutherford, 2003: 380) that defined the nature of 
such capital expenditure as being only a component of a bundling service (Broadbent & 
                                                          
4 See for example the London Underground (Debande, 2002: 375), and the Sydney Airport Link (Chung, 2003). 
5 Although PPPs increasingly become an international phenomenon, not all countries adopted the PPP-PSC value-for-money 
approach, such as the US and France. See for example Grimsey & Lewis (2005).  Evidence in other countries, however, remains 
unexplored (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004: 8). 
6 A 1928 referendum approved constitutional amendments to empower the Commonwealth to co-ordinate borrowings by state 
governments.  The maximum sums were established by agreements amongst the Commonwealth and State governments, and 
allocated by the Loan Council. The Council assigned each state government a ‘global limit’ via a formula based on population 
(Walker & Walker, 2000: 191).    
7 Steering mechanisms are laws, regulations, and other pronouncements that define and operationalise PPPs (English & Guthrie, 
2003: 494). 
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Laughlin, 1999: 98), therefore all payments should be charged to the operating account 
and stay off the government’s balance sheet (Rutherford, 2003: 379).  In Australia, PPPs 
have since become a popular avenue for borrowings by state governments to escape the 
global limits assigned by the Loan Council (NSWPAC, 1994: 41; Walker & Walker, 
2000: 5-7), because spending associated with PPPs did not “qualify” as an asset in the 
public sector’s financial accounts (English & Guthrie, 2003: 494; Quiggin, 2005a: 445).  
The approaches adopted by the British and Australian governments are not consistent 
with the accrual-accounting logic, because to deliver the related services, the profit-
seeking private provider requires financial commitments, in some cases financial 
guarantees, from the responsible public sector purchaser (cf. Mills, 1991).  Thus in 
substance, government purchases of assets or goods and services through PPP 
arrangements are public debts, and should be accounted for as liabilities. 
Ostensibly, the initial engagement in PPP commitments was driven by political rhetoric 
aimed at removing visible public debt.  Shielded by PPPs, governments effectively 
transferred financial burdens to taxpayers.  Seemingly, more recent developments have 
been promoted on the basis that PPPs allow for more efficient allocation of risk, hence 
offer better value for money in the public interest.  The benefit of VFM is challenged in 
Broadbent & Laughlin (2002) as being at odds with the Treasury’s firm stance in 
accounting PFIs as off-balance sheet transactions.  Contrary to the VFM claim, in later 
developments where the private sector has showed promising interest in the market of 
DBFOs, the pursuit of the macroeconomic benefits (meeting ongoing public needs for 
infrastructure-based services without incurring on-balance-sheet debt) remains the 
strong force influencing the policy implementation process. 
Resistance to debt is seen to be legitimate in the view of the state as the custodian of a 
capitalist class society.  The social dynamic framework of interests views “the interests 
of individuals and groups [as being in] part structurally determined by forces that are 
outside their control and part moulded by them in their outworking in particular social 
actions” (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002: 625).  “The state”, represented by the 
institutional form of government (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002: 628), is the political 
organisation of society in which its members associate and organise “for the purpose of 
reaching and implementing collective decisions” (Abelson, 2003: 3).  Herein, the 
interests of the state are structurally determined by the democratic legitimation and 
socially moulded by the interests of the hegemonic capitalist class (Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2002: 625).   
The social interest of the state moulded by the hegemonic capitalist class magnifies the 
regulatory role to enable and defend the capital accumulation process (Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2002: 628).  This particular role of the state proliferates in the rapidly 
globalising capital market.  Increasingly, containment of public debt is perceived by 
international capitalists as a prudent approach to fiscal management.  Thus it pressures 
the state to defend its legitimation at the macroeconomic national and international 
levels (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002: 626).  Within these inextricable social dynamics, 
the use of private capital has become the dictating financial strategy to meeting the 
contradictory demands for prudent level of public debt and replacing the severely 
underinvested public infrastructure that required substantial government subsidy (NSW 
Treasury, 2005: 9, FN5).  The excessive reliance on the bonding with the capitalist class 
to legitimise the state’s existence is not without repercussions.  The lack of reference to 
the community’s interest can dissipate support for the state’s democratic legitimation.  
When this occurs, the bonding between the state and the capitalist will become fragile 
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causing a breakdown in the social contract within the PPP relationship (Johnston & 
Gudergan, 2007). 
The following section traces the rise of the PPPs as the public procurement strategy to 
foster the capital accumulation process via a study of PMBH.  The section finishes off 
with the unveiling of the peril of PPPs through an examination of the CCT.   
 
4. Case studies 
4.1 The Port Macquarie Base Hospital 
4.1.1 Background 
Being one of the first PPP projects in NSW, the PMBH was an experiment to induce the 
private sector to partake in service deliveries which had been traditionally supplied by 
the public sector.   
Since the mid-1970s, there were some suggestions by various elected governments 
(Labor and Coalition)  that a new public hospital was needed to replace the existing 
Hastings District Hospital which was considered severely under-resourced to cope with 
the fast growing region around Port Macquarie (NSWPAC, 1993).  These suggestions 
continued intermittently for over a decade.   The struggle between the shortage of 
funding and the need for an upgraded hospital would have been prolonged and the 
hospital would still have been under proposal if the former NSW Premier, Nick Greiner 
heading the then Coalition Government had not put forward a privatisation program for 
government owned facilities. The Government claimed that the private option offered 
the Port Macquarie community advantages in terms of certainty and timing.   
In December 1992, the Department of Health NSW (DoH) entered into a 20-year, non-
cancellable contract with Mayne Nickless Limited (the Mayne Group), whose 
subsidiary, Health Care of Australia (HCOA), subsequently formed the hospital 
management.  Being the first PPP hospital, the PMBH differed from the archetypical 
DBFO discussed in Section Two in two ways.  First, is the perpetual private ownership 
of the hospital asset.  The contract stipulates that at the end of the 20-year period, the 
owner of the hospital (the PMBH PL) has the right to sell the hospital to any interested 
parties.  The second important difference lies in the delivery of core services supplied 
by the private provider.  The hospital was contracted to treat a mix of 80 percent public 
and 20 percent private patients (NSWAGO, 1996).  The DoH, in turn, promised to 
purchase health care services from the private hospital for a span of 20 years. The 
PMBH established a landmark in health services for NSW.  The government’s role 
changed from that of traditional health service provider to health service purchaser.   
The terms of the project constituted two streams of payments. Through the availability 
charge, the private sector would recover construction costs and all other related 
expenses incurred in the course of building the hospital. In addition, under the 20-year 
service contract, the DoH would pay the service charge to the HCOA covering the 
operational costs of the provision of public hospital services.  The hospital was built on 
a parcel of land owned by the public sector, the Hastings Council.   
In August 1993, the builder, Fletcher Constructions commenced construction.  The 
hospital was commissioned in November 1994 (NSWAGO, 1996).  In October 2003, 
the Mayne Group proposed selling its entire Australian Hospital business, including the 
PMBH, to another private consortium. In April 2004, the State Government commenced 
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legal proceedings against the Mayne Group in relation to the novation of the PMBH 
contract to Affinity Health (part of the buying private consortium).  On 31st January 
2005, after paying 10 years of unitary charges, the Labor Government bought back the 
hospital for $35m8 (price as of 2006).   
 
4.1.2 Funding choices  
An implicit motive attached to the idea of DBFOing the PMBH is that the recourse to 
private finance will have no visible impact on public sector capital spending.  The DoH 
alleged that public finance was unavailable.  To make its case for the private finance 
option, in 1990, the DoH prepared an assessment of the cost of building a new public 
hospital for Port Macquarie, compared with the option of allowing private sector 
provision.  The results of the assessment are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: PMBH Costs assessment(a)(b) 
Comparison of public and private options 
Options  Public Private  Savings 
Total Capital Costs $64 $49  (c) $15 
 
Recurrent Costs (d)     
Year 1 Operating  $30 $28  $2 
 Finance and Capital $6 $4  $2 
 
TOTAL  $36 $32  $4 
20 year contract (NPV @7%)     
 Operating  $335 $306  $29 
 Finance and Capital $93 $65  $28 
 Residual Value -$11 $0  -$11 
 
Total Recurrent Costs $417 $371  $46 
  
(a) Costs are in millions of dollars. 
(b) All costs are in 1991 prices. 
(c) No information is provided for this calculation. 
(d) These are costs of maintaining and running the hospital. 
 
Source: NSW Health Department, 1992: 8; quoted in Collyer (1997: 30) 
Table 1 indicates that the private option would save $15 million in capital and $46 
million in recurrent costs over the 20-year period.  However, why the initial capital 
outlay was $15m higher under the public option than the private option was never fully 
disclosed.  In the absence of information to the contrary it was possible but implausible 
to argue that it was based on the assumption of greater efficiency on the part of the 
private constructor. More plausibly, the $49m estimate for the private option was 
merely the figure upon which the availability charge was based and did not reflect the 
full cost of building and equipping the private hospital (NSWPAC, 1992: 36).  In fact, 
there are better grounds for believing that the publicly financed option would have been 
the lower cost option.  In 1992, the NSW Treasury Corporation 10-year bond rate 
(9.7%) was 2.55% lower compared to the market rate of 12.25% (indicator rate supplied 
by Westpac – one of the major private financial institutions in Australia) (Gain, 1992: 
                                                          
8 Information obtained from media releases from the Department of Health, NSW www.health.nsw.gov.au and the Mayne Group 
www.symbionhealth.com, accessed on 24th August 2007.   
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1).  In other words, government bond financing would have saved State taxpayers 
2.55% in interest expenses.  As is revealed below, in fact the PMBH offered the private 
concessionaire a much better deal than the market could afford.   
The DoH also produced figures to demonstrate that the private option would be less 
expensive, as shown in Table 29.  Both tables were constructed to support a perception 
that the private sector was more cost efficient. It can be argued that this cost advantage 
stems from the favourable terms of the contract offered to the private contractor rather 
than any inherent cost efficiency.  By way of illustration, the ‘availability charge’ 
compensated the private sector for all the tax expenses, a calculation based on a 45% 
corporate income tax rate.  In this sense the $2.2m taxes (see Table 2) from the private 
sector are arguably phantom cash receipts to legitimise the private option.   
 
Table 2:  PMBH Comparative Costs to the Department of Health and State budgets 
Options 
 
New Public New Private Savings 
Number of beds 160 160  
Costs ($m p.a.)    
Total Operating Costs 
Less State Income (Payroll tax etc) 
27.8 27.9 
-2.2(a) 
 
Net Operating Costs to State 27.8 25.7 2.1 
Availability Charge 5.5(b) 3.8(c) 1.7 
Total Costs to Government 33.3 29.5 3.8 
 
(a) The State Government would receive $2.2m in taxes from the private sector. 
(b) The reason why the availability charge under the ‘New Public’ option was higher than that under 
      the ‘New Private’ option was not disclosed. 
(c) The DoH would pay $3.8m per annum 'availability charge' to the private sector for the provision  
      of public health services provided by the private hospital. 
    
Source: NSW Health Department, 1992: 87, requoted in Collyer (1997: 30)  
 
4.1.3 Funding source 
An astute analysis reveals that the hospital’s assets and running costs were entirely 
subsidised by taxpayers.  The availability charge was contrived to burden the DoH with 
most of the financial risks associated with the entire life of the project.  It recompensed 
all the costs incurred in relation to the construction of the hospital, including the design 
and the development of the building, repayment of borrowings, purchases of land, 
payment for legal fees, finance fees, administration fees and taxation expenses, together 
with interest costs on all of these items.  Expenses incurred as the result of ordinary 
repairs and maintenance to the hospital carried out by the operator were also factored 
into the availability charge.  To make the Government’s accounts look better, the DoH 
purchased the land from Hastings Council for $550,000 in 1989 and then onsold it to 
PMBH for $1.2m.  In fact, the DoH reimbursed PMBH the price of the land through its 
availability charge.  Effectively, the Department was borrowing $1.2m from PMBH and 
repaying it plus interest.  The availability charge included an allowance for the payment 
                                                          
9 Differences in the savings presented in Table 1 and Table 2 are largely due to tax effects.  The State Government has the power 
to impose taxes on profits generated by the hospital.   
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of PMBH’s tax liability.  The calculations assume a company tax rate of 45%.  In the 
event the tax rate fell, the benefit to the PMBH PL would increase.10   
The total repayment over the term of the contract (20 years) was $143.6 million (in 
constant dollars).  A discount rate of 13.71% p.a. equates the present value of the total 
20 payments to the value of the hospital at the date of commission (Chung, 2008 
forthcoming).  At the time the contract was signed (1992), the NSW Treasury 
Corporation 10-year bond rate was 9.7%, proving that private finance cost the residents 
of NSW 4.01% more in interest payments.  The DoH was locked into a long term 
financial commitment to guarantee the private consortium an annual risk free and tax 
free return of 13.71%.  NSW taxpayers would have at least gained substantial savings in 
interest payments if they had been calculated using variable rates in accordance with 
movements in the market.11  Moreover, after paying off the availability charge, the DoH 
would not own the hospital at the conclusion of the agreement unless it purchased it at 
market value.  As noted before, it cost the State Government $35m to buy out the 
contract.    
The service charge paid the HCOA a private hospital rate for the public hospital 
services provided.  It was determined on the assumption that the PMBH PL financially 
owned the hospital and needed to repay the capital even though this portion has been 
well covered by the availability charge (evidence given by Tony Harris, the former 
NSW Auditor-General, in FPARC, 1997: 10).  The service charge was made to PMBH 
based on a set fee per service and the number of bed days, irrespective of the actual 
number of services incurred during the year, and up to the budgeted amount 
(NSWAGO, 1996: 404).  The budget can only escalate.  This is because the number of 
services was set by the DoH annually and it was not to be less than the total service 
charge paid in the previous year (NSWAGO, 1996: 403).  Under this condition, the 
DoH retained a downward demand risk.  Fluctuations in real demand would have no net 
effect on the operator’s revenues.  This situation gave the operator an incentive to 
curtail the quality and quantity of services it provided, since fixed revenue was 
guaranteed by the DoH each year.  This ‘incentive’ arrangement had ‘enabled’ the 
PMBH to deliver substantially higher costs of service at observably lower levels of 
quality (Chung, 2008 forthcoming).   
 
4.1.4 The rise of the procurement device  
The Greiner Government was keen to build a private-public hospital as a model for 
subsequent expansions of private participation in the health sector.  The Treasury was 
also pushing the deal.  It argued that the private sector could bring greater competition 
as well as cost-efficient services to the health industry.  It insisted that the PMBH be 
modelled to achieve the role separation of the funding source from the provider in the 
delivery of hospital services, despite the high cost.  The net present value of the 
hospital’s 20 annual payments of availability charges ($67 million)12 is 27.7% higher 
than the initial capital outlay ($52 million).   
                                                          
10 The company tax rate has been falling since. As of the 2004-05 fiscal year (during which the hospital was bought back), the 
company tax rate was 30%.   
11 As of September 2003 (around the time the Mayne Group proposed to sell the PMBH), the 10-year NSW Treasury Bond rate was 5% p.a.  Even the most recent 
rate was only 5.5% (Data obtained from the NSW Treasury Corporation website, www.tcorp.nsw.gov.au, accessed in September 2003 and on 23rd August 2007). 
12 This is calculated using a discount rate equivalent to the 1992 NSW Treasury 10-year bond yield 9.7%.  See Chung (2008 
forthcoming). 
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At the same time, the partnership deal was a useful political strategy to avoid 
accountability.  Several requests were made to the DoH about the contract terms. These 
were refused on the grounds that “details are bound by ‘commercial-in-confidence’”.  
This removes a possible source of support for any contrary argument and leaves it far 
from clear what is the true cost of the PPP experiment.  Such a secrecy component not 
only removes public accountability in the expenditure of public funds, but also proper 
oversight in achieving appropriate standards of care and service for the community the 
hospital was intended to serve.  The contract was structured in a way such that any 
succeeding Health Minister or government would never be able to disclose the true cost 
to taxpayers (NSWLAH, 1995).   
 
4.2 The Cross City Tunnel 
4.2.1 Background  
If the inexperience of the government in contract negotiation is to blame for the poorly 
executed PMBH (evidence given by Tony Harris, the former NSW Auditor-General, in 
FPARC, 1997: 10), it is the government’s aggressive chase for the cost saving strategy 
to fund public infrastructure which sets up the CCT to fail.   
After a decade of State Government effort in promoting the PPP concept within its 
constituents, the procurement policy has started showing promising effectiveness in 
establishing a flourishing PPP market.  Private provision of public infrastructure has 
become a ubiquitous form of infrastructure financing and has acquired a strongly 
institutionalised status (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007).  By the time of entering into 
negotiations for the CCT, the NSW Government was candid about its position on public 
debt.  It considered that at the time of very low levels of general government debt, 
“go[ing] into debt to have the budget deficits…would…have been quite reckless” 
(evidence given by Michael Egan, former NSW Treasurer, in JSCCCT, 2006a: 55),  
because borrowings will mar the state’s capacity to meet expenditure demand in the 
long term arising from the aging population (evidence given by Kerry Scott, Executive 
Director of Private Projects and Asset Management, NSW Treasury, in JSCCCT, 2006a: 
55).  The decision that private finance was the only option to provide the CCT was 
made to fulfil the government’s key commitment of “no public money going into this 
[project]” (evidence given by Bob Carr, former NSW Premier, in JSCCCT, 2006b: 43). 
 
4.2.2 The project 
The DBFO contract was awarded to CrossCity Motorway Pty Ltd (CCM) in 2002.  
Table 3 highlights some of the attributes of the tunnel project.  The cost funded by CCM 
is just over $1 billion (NSWAGO, 2006: 20).  In principle, for every 6-month period, 
the CCM is required to pay rents to the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA, the public 
agency that lets the contract) for the land leased, and the right of operating the asset and 
charging road users.  Rent payments comprise two components: (i) a nominal base 
component of $3.50 plus 35% of the actual gross revenue from non-toll business less 
taxes (other than income tax); and (ii) an incentive rent, which is RTA’s share of toll 
revenues (RTA, 2003: 36).  The incentive rent is payable to RTA when the actual 
revenue receipts are 10% higher than those forecast in CCM’s base case financial 
model.  The Government’s share of incentive rent increases in proportion to the 
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percentage of excess revenue.  The excess falls into four bands running the gamut from 
10% to 50% plus.  At the lowest band of 10%, the government’s share of the excess 
revenue is 10%.  Its share is capped at 50% (RTA, 2003: 36, Table 2).  The “banding” 
concept is consistent with economies of scale prevailing in road infrastructure where the 
marginal cost of providing road service is negligible.  There is no evidence of rent 
receipts by RTA.  In fact, rent income is highly unlikely given the tunnel’s poor 
patronage and the financial difficulty confronting the tunnel operator.     
 
Table 3: Attributes of the Cross City Tunnel 
 
Opening to traffic  August 2005 
Contractual Date for opening  18 October 2005  
Projected Date for handover  December 2035  
Concession Period  30 years 
Capital Cost  $1 billion  
Upfront Payment to RTA  $96.8M + gst  (RDF + BCF) 
Other charges payable to RTA Land rent (basic + incentive) 
Annual Average Daily Traffic 30, 000 at June 2007(a)  
Present Toll (full length cartrip)(b)  $3.56 full tunnel; $1.68 for SJYC exit; both  directions  
Consortium Partners (major equity 
holders)  
ABN Amro, Leighton Holdings from June 2007; previously 
CKI, Bilfinger Berger, SAS Trustee Corporation, JPMorgan 
Nominees Australia  
Operator  CrossCity Motorway subcontracting to Baulderstone 
Hornibrook  
 
Clegg & Poljak (2007). 
Current as of January 2008. 
BCF: Business Consideration Fee; RDF: Reimbursement for Development Fee; SJYC: St John Young Crescent  
Source: NSWIIG (2005); NSWAGO (2006); RTA (2003; 2007) 
 
The CCM has no financial recourse to RTA.  To maintain its commitment to deliver the 
project at ‘no net cost to government’, the RTA sought an upfront payment from the 
private tenders to cover the project development costs (NSWAGO, 2006: 33).  Rather 
than the ability to provide the CCT at the lowest toll for motorists, the capacity to afford 
this upfront payment was the decisive advantage to the tenderer who wished to win the 
concession (NSWAGO, 2006: 25).   
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4.2.3 Key attributes 
One of the remarkable differences of the CCT is the ‘unprecedented’13 concept of the 
Business Consideration Fee (BCF) auctioned by the RTA.  In contrast to the disclosure 
in RTA’s Contract Summary issued in 2003, where the payment of $96.8m was for the 
“right to undertake the project” (RTA, 2003: 19), the audit office contested that the 
payment comprised a fee of $54m to reimburse the RTA the costs incurred with respect 
to the project, and a BCF component of $46.1m for the right to operate the tunnel.  Both 
concepts were communicated to bidders in the tender documents and they were invited 
to bid for both components (evidence given by Danny Graham, NSW Treasury, in 
JSCCCT, 2006b: 73).  This payment increased the cost to the concessionaire, who was 
expected to recoup it through imposing higher tolls on tunnel users.  The CCM was 
selected because it offered the highest upfront payment.14  To showcase its capacity to 
earn greater revenue sooner and to offer the BCF (JSCCCT, 2006b: 81), CCM modelled 
unusually optimistic traffic forecasts that exceeded the ceiling capacities in its 
competitors’ and RTA’s estimates (NSWAGO, 2006: 5).  Clearly, the BCF has 
overshadowed this abnormality.      
Another unparalleled concept of the CCT promoted by the RTA was its ‘no net cost to 
government’.  In the absence of thorough public interest evaluation (JSCCCT, 2006b: 
35) and representations of tunnel users in the negotiations (NSWAGO, 2006: 47), this 
means no net cost to the RTA and that all cost increases would be passed on to 
motorists by way of toll increases.  To avoid $110 million in capital spending arising 
from changes that would maximise revenue to the operator (JSCCCT, 2006b: 75), RTA 
negotiated two separate deals with CCM to recover subsequent cost increases.  One was 
to change the toll escalation formula (originally toll variation was linked to CPI 
increases) which would have an impact on the toll being 35% greater than originally 
planned by 2018.  The other was to allow CCM to raise the base toll by 15 cents (30 
cents for heavy vehicles).  The combined effect of these two deals results in an increase 
of up to 51 cents in the toll on tunnel opening (NSWAGO, 2006: 6).  The impacts of 
these two deals on tolls are outlined in Table 4. 
The RTA’s insistence on capping its capital spending has overridden the tunnel’s 
primary objective.  Originally, the CCT was part of the integrated transport networks 
planning.  The purpose was to funnel traffic bypassing central Sydney into an 
underground tunnel in order to improve the public domain by reducing surface traffic 
and reallocating road space to public transport, pedestrians and cyclists (NSWAGO, 
2006: 18).  The planning focus soon changed to making the tunnel a viable business 
proposition to private capital providers and not costing government money (NSWAGO, 
2006: 63).   
The most significant change to the original plan is related to the nature of the tunnel.  
The RTA settled a non-conforming bid that proposed a longer tunnel than the original 
design, which would cost the government $42 million (RTA, 2003: 11), for a $96.8 
million financial package paid to the state.  The revised scheme was considered “more 
environmentally damaging and impos[ing] unacceptable impacts on local 
residents…with a tenderer benefiting from the changes designed to maximise revenues” 
(evidence given by Clover Moore, the Lord Mayor of Sydney, in JSCCCT, 2006b: 75).  
                                                          
13 The concept of selling the right to charge toll is not new in Australia.  In the 19th century, the Governor of the colony of NSW 
Lachlan Macquarie implemented a system of private turnpikes as a means of financing transport infrastructure.  The right to 
collect tolls was publicly auctioned by the Government (Forward, 2006). 
14 Other bidders sought a payment from the RTA (NSWAGO, 2006: 24).  
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To make the tunnel a financially viable business that would interest the private sector, 
the RTA changed the plan further and added the Harbour Street exit to the tunnel albeit 
this would significantly increase congestion in the central business district of Sydney.  It 
successfully persuaded the Department of Planning to pass the proposal of opening up 
the exit by arguing that removing the exit would reduce traffic by 23% thus eroding the 
tunnel’s financial attractiveness (NSWAGO, 2006: 63).   
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Table 4: Changes to the CCT toll compared with the original project concept 
 
Toll Component Original Project Concept After the Change Reason for Change 
Toll Escalation 
Formula 
CPI adjusted toll escalation Opening – Dec 2011(a): 
Greater of 4% and CPI 
Jan 2012 – Dec 2017(a): 
Greater of 3% and CPI 
After Dec 2017(a), (b): 
Greater of CPI and 0%  
To avoid the RTA paying an extra $75 million 
costs following the Supplementary Environment 
Impact Statement (EIS) and associated additional 
Conditions of Approval 
Base Toll Level Cars: 
$2.50 for main tunnel 
$1.10 for exit at SJYC  
Heavy vehicles: 
$5.00 for main tunnel 
$2.20 exit at SJYC 
Cars: 
$2.65 for main tunnel 
$1.25 for exit at SJYC 
Heavy vehicles: 
$5.30 for main tunnel 
$2.50 for exit at SJYC 
Allowed in return for CCM carrying out $35 
million of additional work identified for the RAT 
Source: NSWAGO (2006); JSCCT (2006a)  
 
Quarterly adjusted.  Effectively, the adjustment is greater than 4%.  If the CPI was treated as an annual figure then the toll charged at 31 December 2005 would 
have been $3.45 not $3.56. 
If CPI is negative during any quarter, the toll will remain at the same level until the CPI is positive.   
SJYC: Sir John Young Crescent  
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4.2.4 The breakdown in the social contract 
Restricting access to surface roads was perceived by the public as profiting the tunnel 
operator at the cost of motorists.  Resistance to excessive tolls and road changes (67 
road changes had been planned or implemented (JSCCCT, 2006b: Appendix 5)) 
signalled the strong public disapproval of the CCT.  At this stage, the bonding of the 
PPP relationship started to rift.  The dynamics between the government and the CCM 
became strained (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007) and disagreements soon intensified when 
both parties were brought into disrepute by media exposure.    
Avoiding public debt was the factor dictating the government’s decision to procure the 
CCT through DBFO.  This background consideration has reduced the possibility of 
public control over this major infrastructure (JSCCCT, 2006b: 42).  The tunnel was 
placed in receivership in December 2006, a year after its opening due to poor patronage.  
It was sold to another private consortium (ABN Amro and Leightons) in 2007 for $700 
million.  By that time actual patronage had been under a third of the CCM estimates 
(Clegg & Poljak, 2007).  The unprecedented BCF, a price auctioned for the license to 
collect a monopoly toll, was disparaged as the worst expedient of public finance 
(Quiggin, 2005b: 26).   
 
5. Conclusion  
After two decades of experience, the government has successfully launched PPPs as the 
procurement method to manage its levels of public debt.  However, it is contestable 
whether VFM can be materialised by this innovative financing strategy.  The above 
analysis identified a couple of significant factors that militated against the success of 
PPPs.  As clearly seen in the PMBH, the dedication of the government to the private 
provision of services for operating the hospital has failed the government’s stewardship 
function of ensuring that financing was channelled through appropriate risk sharing 
arrangements.  Nevertheless, it opened the infrastructure market for PPPs.  In a more 
recent PPP venture of the CCT, the government defended its rigid adherence to restraint 
in capital spending as being necessary because of the growing demand on government 
funds by the aging population.  To date, no assets and liabilities related to the PPP toll 
roads are recognised in the RTA’s balance sheet15 (RTA, 2007), albeit the promises of 
returns to private equity are explicated in the concession contracts (cf. NSWAGO, 1995; 
RTA, 1998).  This observation further confirms that PPPs contrive to remove visible 
debt off the government’s books.    
Within the social dynamic framework of interests, PPPs are a powerful device to 
balance the state’s role as the legitimiser of global capital accumulation processes and 
as the insurer of the adequate supply of national public services.  They alleviate the 
famine for funds for public services without lifting the fiscal gauge beyond the 
‘prudent’ level.  The interest of capitalist class has dictated the state’s societal 
functionality within these inextricable social dynamics.  In this process, the government 
acts without being accountable to other members of the society.   
The recent CCT lesson demonstrates that the rhetoric of debt containment has not only 
distorted the PPPs policy but also imperilled the legitimacy of the state.  It is timely for 
                                                          
15 Except for the Sydney Harbour Tunnel in which revenue guarantees are legalised by the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (Private Joint 
Venture) Act 1987. 
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policy makers to rethink their role in the democratic legitimation.  One way to 
strengthen this position is to segregate the oversight function of the scheme (a function 
that carries the power to approve projects or reject PPPs that are not designated as being 
in the public interest) from the Treasury.  Currently, there is a clear conflict of interests 
within the Treasury as the endorser of the policy and as the oversight authority.   
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